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Abstract
It was hands across the water when both a U.S. district court and the European
Commission cleared the $10.3 billion merger of Oracle and PeopleSoft. The De-
partment of Justice, which had opposed the deal, had decided not to appeal its
defeat in the San Francisco court, and it is thought that the Commission took this
as a sign that U.S. regulators would not take it amiss if their European counter-
parts also let the merger proceed. In any event, there was none of the resentment
and outrage that bubbled over not so long ago when U.S. antitrust authorities ap-
proved the GE/Honeywell deal and their European counterparts killed it. With
Oracle/PeopleSoft, convergence was the word of the day. But a close look at the
U.S. court decision and the European regulatory ruling in late 2004 reveals how
often the San Francisco judge and the Brussels authorities took dramatically dif-
ferent approaches to important components of their decisions. Two lawyers rep-
resenting Oracle before the European Commission, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr ‘s Sven Vo¨lcker and Christian Duvernoy of the firm’s Brussels office,
identify no fewer than six key issues on which the American court and the Euro-
pean Commission took diametrically opposed positions. Fielding a team led by
former Director-General of DG Competition at the European Commission, Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann, Wilmer was EU antitrust co-counsel to Oracle together with
long-standing European antitrust2004 when the bidder announced that it had at
last gained control of its target. Oracle CEO Lawrence Ellison had been review-
ing strategic acquisitions for some time and PeopleSoft had been on his list of
candidates. Larry Ellison has said publicly that software is due for consolidation
and he clearly wanted to be a survivor.
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IT WAS HANDS ACROSS THE WATER WHEN both
a U.S. district court and the European
Commission cleared the $10.3 billion merger
of Oracle and PeopleSoft. 
The Department of Justice, which had
opposed the deal, had decided not to appeal
its defeat in the San Francisco court, and it is
thought that the Commission took this as a
sign that U.S. regulators would not take it
amiss if their European counterparts also let
the merger proceed. In any event, there was
none of the resentment and outrage that bub-
bled over not so long ago when U.S. antitrust
authorities approved the GE/Honeywell deal
and their European counterparts killed it. 
With Oracle/PeopleSoft, convergence was
the word of the day.
But a close look at the U.S. court decision
and the European regulatory ruling in late
2004 reveals how often the San Francisco
judge and the Brussels authorities took dra-
matically different approaches to important
components of their decisions. Two lawyers
representing Oracle before the European
Commission, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr ’s Sven Volcker and Christian
Duvernoy of the firm’s
Brussels office, identify no
fewer than six key issues
on which the American
court and the European
Commission took diamet-
rically opposed positions.
(Fielding a team led by for-
mer Director-General of
DG Competition at the
European Commission,
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann,
Wilmer was EU antitrust
co-counsel to Oracle
together with long-stand-
ing European antitrust
counsel to Oracle, Thomas Vinje and his team
at Clifford Chance.)
The progress of the deal also reveals how
daunting it can be to manage two different
procedures occurring virtually simultane-
ously not only physically but often metaphys-
ically thousands of miles apart. Advisors to
both sides were at times reluctant to speak for
attribution given that they will have to
appear again before regulators on each side of
the Atlantic and elsewhere. Still, those
involved in this deal, as well as outside
experts who followed both proceedings
closely, agree that Oracle’s representatives
did an enviable job of juggling two time
schedules, two judicial systems, two sets of
expert witness testimony, regulators about to
retire, discovery requirements and legal theo-
ries in both California and Belgium.
An 18-Month Wrangle
The deal that turned into an 18-month
wrangle began with Oracle’s announcement
of its intentions on June 6, 2003 and only
ended shortly after 1 A.M. on December 29,
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2004 when the bidder announced that it had at
last gained control of its target. Oracle CEO
Lawrence Ellison had been reviewing strategic
acquisitions for some time and PeopleSoft had
been on his list of candidates. Larry Ellison has
said publicly that software is due for consolida-
tion and he clearly wanted to be a survivor.  
Craig Conway, the former CEO of
PeopleSoft and a former Oracle employee, had
himself once broached the possibility of a deal.
However, the unsolicited takeover bid from
Oracle did not go down well at PeopleSoft, and
the fight quickly became personal. Mr. Ellison
at one point was quoted as saying that if he had
one bullet and was faced with a choice of shoot-
ing Mr. Conway or Mr. Conway’s dog, he
would know what to do. 
PeopleSoft immediately raised an antitrust
defense, which Oracle did not expect, and started
its antitrust road show. Customers and state
attorneys general argued that the deal would be a
so-called 3-to-2 merger and would not get regula-
tory clearance. The Hart-Scott-Rodino filing was
sent in on June 12 and the Department of Justice
issued it Second Request on June 30, 2003. 
Meanwhile, in Brussels, things moved more
slowly. “The Commission was not keen to get us
in early,” recalls Mr. Volcker. Once a Form CO is
filed, the Commission must follow a strict
timetable and would have had only a month for
an initial review period. The sense was that the
Commission wanted time to educate itself on the
software industry. Also, the Commission may
have taken the view that the center of gravity for
this particular deal lay in the U.S. and that the
Commission should watch and wait. Perhaps not
unrelated to the Commission’s reticence was the
fact that these were the summer months, with
August, the traditional holiday month in Europe,
rapidly approaching. “In August,” says one
antitrust specialist with experience in Brussels,
“they don’t like filings.”
It was a long slow summer in Brussels, with
the Second Request from the  Department of
Justice taking longer than anticipated. Then, as
the autumn came, the pace accelerated and the
Commission pressed Oracle to start the process.
PeopleSoft was anxious to get an answer and had
started to lobby for action. Oracle filed its Form
CO on October 14, triggering the month-long ini-
tial phase of the Commission’s inquiry. Pointed
questions were being put to Oracle by the
Commission, questions that seemed to articulate
PeopleSoft’s objections to the deal. Both sides
began to assume that the Commission would
decide to move to Phase II, giving itself another
four months to investigate the deal. Sure enough,
the Commission announced Phase II on
November 17.
Oracle hoped that the Commission would
hold off on any possible Statement of Objections
until after the DOJ had decided whether or not to
challenge the deal in the U.S. Best not to have
opposition to the deal from Europe while
American regulators were still deciding what to
do. The bidder’s team got the break they were
hoping for. 
Just before Christmas, the Commission issued
an information request to Oracle. Recalls Mr.
Duvernoy: “It was quite extensive and not easy
to comply with in the short time frame.” The
Commission agreed to give Oracle more time and
pressed the pause button. Through the stop-the-
clock following Phase II, the Commission got
synchronized with the U.S. timetable. It would
not be issuing a Statement of Objections until
after the DOJ would decide whether to take the
deal to court.”
The U.S. regulators filed suit on February 26,
2004 before Chief Judge Vaughn Walker of the
Northern District of California. Soon after, on
March 12, the Commission issued its Statement of
Objections, just in time for the deadline for this
step to occur, which is typically ten weeks after
the start of a Phase II investigation. Says Mr.
Volcker: “They couldn’t have waited much
longer.” 
The Commission had the choice of two analy-
ses to apply to the Oracle/PeopleSoft proposed
merger, either the unilateral effects test or the
coordinated effects theory. The Oracle team had
been discussing the latter test with Brussels,
arguing that the deal would easily pass muster
under the coordinated effects analysis. 
Under the coordinated effects theory, as Judge
Vaughn explains it in his ruling, “the merger may
diminish competition by ‘enabling the firms . . .
more likely, more successfully, or more com-
pletely to engage in coordination interaction.’
This behavior can be express or tacit (implied by
silence), and the behavior may or may not be
lawful in and of itself. The [DOJ and FTC
Horizontal Merger] Guidelines,” the judge
writes, “explicitly recognize that successful coor-
dinated interaction ‘entails reaching (1) terms of
coordination that are profitable to the firms
involved and (2) an ability to detect and punish
[cheating].’ Examples of ‘terms that are prof-
itable’ include common pricing, fixed price dif-
ferentials, stable market shares and customer or
territorial restrictions.”
The M&A journal
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The unilateral effects theory, on the other
hand, postulates that the merger will enable the
new company to raise prices and inhibit competi-
tion just by virtue of the fact that the two former
competitors are now one entity. 
As Wachtell’s Michael Byowitz, Joseph Larson
and David Schwartz explain the test in a recent
memo to clients: “Since the early 1990s, the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission have premised most of their chal-
lenges to mergers on a ‘unilateral effects’ theory,
which focuses on whether the elimination of
competition between the merging parties will
allow the combined firm to raise prices on its
own (that is, without reference to other competi-
tors). This theory postulates that when dealing
with differentiated products or services, a
merged firm may be able to raise its prices if the
offerings of the parties are particularly close sub-
stitutes. Under the DOJ and FTC Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, unless repositioning by com-
petitors is sufficient to replace the reduction in
competition between the merging parties, the
DOJ and FTC will presume that a merger is anti-
competitive if the offerings of the merging parties
are close substitutes and account for 35 percent of
the broad product market in which the firms
compete.”
The Department of Justice had sued to block
the merger on the grounds that it failed the uni-
lateral effects test. Judge Walker outlined the the-
ory as follows: “There is little case law on unilat-
eral effects merger analysis. Few published deci-
sions have even discussed the issue, at least using
the term ‘unilateral effects’ . . . Unilateral effects
result from ‘the tendency of a horizontal merger
to lead to higher prices simply by virtue of the
fact that the merger will eliminate direct competi-
tion between the two merging firms, even if all
other firms in the market continue to compete
independently.’ ”
Surprise!
On March 12, a surprise jumped from the
pages of the Commission’s Statement of
Objections. The Commission was trying to chal-
lenge the deal under the unilateral effects theory
after all, the same approach taken by the DOJ in
California. 
The Oracle team was now worried that
Brussels might issue its ruling before the San
Francisco court had time to make its decision.
The Commission held an oral hearing on March
30 and April 1. “At the oral hearing,” says Wilmer
Cutler ’s Mr. Duvernoy, “we did raise a lot of
questions about the Commission’s analysis of the
Two Timetables
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market. They were pursuing a unilateral effects
theory late in the game, and we talked about all
the data they would need to prove that.”
In response, the Commission issued what
became known as “the request from hell”: the
Commission told the Oracle team to prepare a
spread sheet covering all the bids in the market
that had occurred over the previous three years,
including whether it was each company’s central
purchasing or one of its subsidiaries that would
be the buyer, who was bidding, who was selected
for the final round, who won and who lost and at
what prices, the geographical location of the
buyer, the components of the bid, the automatic
volume discount offered, and the additional dis-
cretionary discount. According to the
Commission’s decision, the list ended up cover-
ing 728 bids from 2001 to 2003 with an average
license value of EUR 708,851.
Then came more good news. The Commission
again gave Oracle time to comply and stopped
the regulatory clock once again on April 14. The
clock would not be restarted for just under six
months, on October 7, 2005, a month after Judge
Vaughn cleared the deal.
The Seven Deadlies 
Although the result was the same in both, each
of the two decisions rests on vastly differing
premises: the very definition of the market in
question; ways to identify the players in that mar-
ket; and three forces that would arguably work to
ensure that competition would not be constricted
by the proposed merger—outsourcing; best-of-
breed vendors and systems integrators.
The first question before both Judge Walker
and the Commission was market definition.
“This was the central issue in the cases,” says Mr.
Duvernoy. “Oracle and PeopleSoft both sell soft-
ware that allows companies to automate back-
office functions like human resources, account-
ing, customer relations management and supply
chain management. PeopleSoft said there was a
high-end to this market that only PeopleSoft,
Oracle  and Germany-based SAP could serve.
Oracle argued, and convinced Judge Walker, that
this market definition didn’t make sense.”
First, we turn to Judge Walker for both his
explication of this segment of the software indus-
try and for his analysis of PeopleSoft’s definition
of that market. As his opinion proceeds, we see
that he “picks apart plaintiff’s market definition
piece by piece,” which is how he describes what
Oracle does to its adversary. The Commission, on
the other hand, accepts the definition completely.
Here is Judge Walker:
Of the many types of computer software,
such as operating system software, data-
base software, integration software (some-
times called “middleware” in software par-
lance) and utilities software, this case
involved only one—application software.
And within this type, the present case deals
with only applications that automate the
overall business data processing of business
and similar entities; these applications are
called “enterprise application software”
(EAS). There are three main kinds of EAS.
Plaintiffs single out one.
Some EAS programs are mass market PC-
based applications of fairly limited “func-
tionality” (meaning capability). Other EAS
programs are developed by or for a specific
enterprise and its particular needs; most
large organizations had such specially
designed EAS (called “legacy software”)
prior to the advent of the products in this
suit. Plaintiffs focus their claims on the
third, intermediate category of EAS—enter-
prise resource planning (ERP) systems soft-
ware. ERP is packaged software that inte-
grates most of an entity’s data across all or
most of the entity’s activities.…
ERP programs have been developed to
handle the full range of an enterprise’s
activities; these include human relations
management (HRM), financial manage-
ment systems (FMS), customer relations
management (CRM), supply chain manage-
ment (SCM), Product Life Cycle
Management, Business Intelligence (BI),
among others. These are called “pillars.”
Although ERP encompasses many pillars,
plaintiffs assert claims with respect to only
two pillars, HRM and FMS.
Within these two pillars, plaintiffs further
limit their claims to only those HRM and
FMS products able to meet the needs of
large and complex enterprises with “high
functional needs.” Plaintiffs label HRM and
FMS products capable of meeting these
high function needs “high function HRM
software” and “high function FMS soft-
ware,” respectively. ERP pillars incapable of
meeting these high function needs are
called “mid-market” software by plaintiffs.
“High function software” is a term
adopted by plaintiffs to describe what they
contend is the separate and distinct line of
commerce in which they contend competi-
tion would be lessened by the proposed
The M&A journal
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acquisition. Plaintiffs apply the term “high
function” to both HRM and FMS. “High
function software,” as defined by plaintiffs,
has no recognized meaning in the industry.
Rather, industry participants and soft-
ware vendors use the terms “enterprise”
software, “up-market” software and “Tier
One” software to denote ERP that is capable
of executing a wide array of business
processes at a superior level of perfor-
mance. Software vendors use these terms to
focus sales and marketing initiatives. . . .
Plaintiffs allege that the HRM and FMS
sold by Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP are the
only HRM and FMS products that can
appropriately be deemed “high function
HRM and FMS.”
Plaintiffs allege that these “high function”
HRM and FMS products have the “scale and
flexibility to support thousands of simulta-
neous users and many tens of thousands of
simultaneous transactions and the ability to
integrate seamlessly into bundles or ‘suites’
of associated HRM and FMS functions.”
Plaintiffs allege that “high function” HRM
and FMS products compete in a market that
is separate and distinct from that of all other
ERP products, such as SCM, CRM or mid-
market HRM and FMS, the latter being
HRM or FMS products designed for organi-
zations having less demanding needs. These
mid-market products include Oracle’s E-
Business Suite Special Edition, SAP’s
MySAP and All-in-One, PeopleSoft’s
PeopleSoft EnterpriseOne and the products
of ERP vendors such as Lawson and AMS.
Moreover, plaintiffs allege that this com-
petition is geographically confined to the
United States. Within this narrowly defined
product and geographic market, plaintiffs
allege that with limited and specially
explained exceptions, only Oracle,
PeopleSoft and, to a lesser degree, SAP’s
United States arm, SAP America, are in
effective competition. The proposed merger
would therefore, in plaintiffs’ view, con-
strict this highly concentrated oligopoly to
a duopoly of SAP America and a merged
Oracle/PeopleSoft.
Oracle, predictably enough, contends
that plaintiffs’ market definition is legally
and practicably too narrow. Oracle con-
tends that (1) “high function” HRM and
FMS software does not exist; “high func-
tion” is simply a label created by plaintiffs;
(2) there is just one market for all HRM and
FMS ERP products; (3) many firms other
than the three identified by plaintiffs com-
pete in the business of developing, produc-
ing, marketing and maintaining HRM and
FMS ERP software; (4) this competition
plays out in many more products than
those in the HRM and FMS pillars; (5) price
competition comes from sources in addition
to ERP software vendors and includes com-
petition from firms that provide outsourc-
ing of data processing, the integration layer
of the “software stack” and from the dura-
bility and adaptability of enterprises’
installed base or legacy systems; (6) the geo-
graphic area of compe-
tition is worldwide or,
at the very least, the
United States and
Europe; (7) the knowl-
edgeable and sophisti-
cated customers of ERP
software would impede
the exercise of any mar-
ket power by a merged
Oracle/PeopleSoft; and
(8) potential entrants
are poised to enter into
competition, so that the
proposed merger will
not have an anticompet-
itive effect. . . .
Oracle did not pro-
pose a product market definition. Instead,
Oracle picked apart plaintiffs’ market defin-
ition piece by piece. Two expert witnesses,
Professor Jerry Hausman, an industrial
organization economist at MIT, and Tom
Campbell, dean of the Haas Graduate
School of Business at the University of
California (Berkeley) testified for Oracle. . . .
Vague: Hausman characterized the “high
function” label as vague and too “hard to
get your arms around.” . . .
Disconnected. Oracle also argued that
plaintiffs’ product market definition “does
not address the market reality” of the way
software is sold . . . Hausman posited that
FMS and HRM are not products in and of
themselves. Rather, “90 percent” of compa-
nies “are buying more than just FMS, more
than just HRM. [they are] buying bundles
of software.”
Underinclusive. Finally, Oracle’s witnesses
stated that even if one assumes that a “high
function HRM and FMS” market does exist
and the market can be demarcated from
other solutions, there are viable substitutes
5
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for high function ERP that must be included
in the product market. Specifically, Oracle
argued that (1) mid-market vendors, (2)
outsourcing, (3) incumbent systems, and (4)
best of breed solutions, discussed above,
must all be included in the product market,
as all are potential substitutes constraining
a post-merger SSNIP [small but significant
non-transitory increase in price].
Throughout his opinion, Judge Walker has lit-
tle time for PeopleSoft’s definition of the product
market. The Commission, in contrast, quickly
takes hold of the proffered definition of “high
function” software:
(59) The market investigation has shown
that, within complex EAS solutions, a delin-
eation according to EAS “pillars” or groups
of functionalities is necessary. This segmen-
tation would in particular single out “high-
function” solutions in the field of FMS and
of HR, as opposed to other specific pillars
(or group of functionalities) such as CRM,
SCM or PM. Apart from the fact that each
pillar, i.e. HR, FMS, SCM, CRM, is intrinsi-
cally linked to specific business functions
and therefore is hardly substitutable from
both a demand and (to a lesser extent) sup-
ply side viewpoint, it is important to note
that, in contrast with other business appli-
cation software, FMS and HR solutions are
the administrative and financial backbone
of an entire organization and represent the
key application software in an undertaking
(their “back office” functions), regardless of
the industry sector in which the company
may be active.
(60) For these two groups of functionali-
ties (HR and FMS), customers having high
level functional needs (such as large organi-
zations with complex functional needs)
require software and accompanying ser-
vices with performance characteristics of a
particularly high standard. The FMS and
HR software solutions concerned by this
transaction are those that can be integrated
into suites of associated functions and are
usually accompanied by a high level of ser-
vice and support. These solutions normally
exhibit the specific characteristics of com-
plexity and performance that satisfy the
high-standard requirements and are there-
fore typically purchased and used by large
customers having complex needs (here-
inafter these EAS solutions are also referred
to as “high-function” solutions or soft-
ware).
(61) In reply to the Commission’s state-
ment of objections, Oracle submitted that
the Commission used vague concepts such
as large enterprise with complex functional
The M&A journal
6
Oracle
continued
Two Roads 
The issues that divided the US district court and the European Commission
Issue US District Court European Commission
“High function” software definition Rejected Accepted
Proxies for enterprises with Not pleaded, 10,000 employees/
“high function needs” (employees, revenue) rejected by implication EUR 1 bn revenue proxy used
Total license value as proxy for high-function software $500,000 threshold rejected EUR 1 million threshold used
Outsourcing as competitive restraint Accepted Rejected
“Mid-market vendors” as competitive restraint Lawson, AMS, Microsoft Lawson, Microsoft, 
Intentia, IFS, QAD
Best-of-breed vendors as competitive restraint Accepted Rejected
Systems integrators as competitive restraint Accepted (?) Rejected
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needs (LCE) and “High-function HR and
FMS solutions” which are not defined,
except for “circular” references, nor do they
have a recognized meaning in the industry.
(62) In this respect, at the outset, it has to
be stated that the investigation allowed a
progressively refined understanding of the
market. Within HR and FMS software,
product pricing, characteristics and
intended use make it possible to distin-
guish—from an antitrust analysis perspec-
tive—software having particularly high
standards of performance, suitable for orga-
nizations having the highest functional
requirements, from simpler software per-
forming at a lower rate of throughput and
suitable for less complex, or simpler organi-
zations. This software having the capability
of executing a wide array of business
processes at a superior level of performance
has been identified in the Commission’s
statement of objections as “high-function”.
This high-function software has certain
characteristics in terms of, inter alia, scala-
bility, configurability, sophistication, pric-
ing, of the software and of reliability, qual-
ity and brand recognition of the vendor. In
the industry, this software is referred to in
different ways, using various terminologies
(“upmarket software”, “tier-one software,”
“enterprise software”). The sales process of
this “high-function” or “enterprise” soft-
ware is lengthy and involves extensive
sharing of information between candidate
vendors and the customer.
Proxies
The next issue on which the two part
company is the question of proxies. Not
surprisingly, Judge Walker has little interest
in what sort of proxy to use to identify
enterprises with high-function needs since
he does not accept the existence of such a
market. Conversely, the Commission does
make such choices since it does see a high-
function market and does agree that there is
such an animal as an LCE, or “Large
Complex Enterprise,” that will be affected
by the proposed merger of Oracle and
PeopleSoft.
The judge writes:
“Large Complex Enterprises” (LCE) is a
term adopted by plaintiffs to describe the
ERP customers that have “high function
software” needs. Based on the testimony
described hereafter, the court finds that
industry participants and software vendors
do not typically use this term and it has no
widely accepted meaning in the industry.
While many in the software industry dif-
ferentiate between large customers and
mid-market customers, there is no “bright
line” test for what is a “large” or “up-mar-
ket” customer. Likewise, there is no
“bright line” test for what is a “mid-mar-
ket” customer. ERP vendors, analysts, sys-
tems integrators and others in the industry
define the mid-market variously. Compare
TR at 864:19-865:2 (Keating) (noting vari-
ability of definitions and that Bearing
Point generally refers to mid-market as
customers in its General Business Group,
which is synonymous with companies
having less than $2 billion in revenue) with
TR at 1846:17-1847:15 (Wilmington)
(PeopleSoft formerly defined mid-market
as less than $500 million revenue, but after
acquiring JD Edwards, it raised mid-mar-
ket to include companies with less than $1
billion revenue).
Prior to Oracle’s tender offer, PeopleSoft
used a proxy of $500 million in revenue to
distinguish mid-market customers from
large customers. SAP defines its “large
enterprise” market as companies with more
than $1.5 billion in revenues. Oracle seg-
ments the market based on the customers’
revenue level or number of employees. 
Plaintiffs failed to show ERP vendors dis-
tinguish mid-market customers from large
customers on the amount of money spent in
an ERP purchase. Yet, as discussed below,
this was the basis on which plaintiffs
attempted to quantify the ERP market.
The Commission takes a different approach:
(116) [I]t is concluded that there are sepa-
rate products aimed at satisfying the needs
of large enterprises with complex func-
tional needs for HR and FMS application
software which also constitute distinct
product markets. The Commission further
established who the suppliers of such prod-
ucts are. Those suppliers form the competi-
tive constraints for a combined
Oracle/PeopleSoft in the markets at stake.
(117) The high-function HR and FMS
solutions are applications to serve complex
organizations/companies which have a
very high level of functional needs. The
Commission established the suppliers in
7
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the market by looking at the bids made by
suppliers for such customers, thus for large
enterprises needing complex functionality
in the field of HR and FMS applications.
However, it appears difficult to draw a
clear-cut line between the customers on the
basis of the complexity of their needs and
therefore between high-function software
and customers on the one hand, and mid-
market software and customers on the
other hand. In order to
be able to carry out an
investigation in this
respect, the Commis-
sion used proxies to
describe those cus-
tomers and the transac-
tions for such software
applications.
(118) As a first suit-
able proxy for the “com-
plexity” of the require-
ments for large organi-
zations, the Commis-
sion considered the net
license value of the sale
to be appropriate. It
appeared that a net license value of EUR 1
million would be an appropriate benchmark
for EAS solutions responding to a high stan-
dard of complexity. Considering the results
of the market investigation in terms of the
value of bids launched by typical large
enterprises with complex functional needs,
the value of EUR 1 million can be consid-
ered as a significant proxy for the value of a
deal being launched by such a customer for
a set of HR and/or FMS functionalities.
Nevertheless, it is apparent from the analy-
sis of the latest bid data provided by Oracle
on 27 September 2004 (in reply to the
Commission’s request for information
adopted by decision pursuant to Article
11(5) of the Merger Regulation on 14 April
2004 after the Oral Hearing) that this value
may be considered appropriate, but that
bids falling short of this license value need
not necessarily be excluded from the mar-
kets for high-function HR and FMS solu-
tions for this reason alone.
(119) This may be true even though
Oracle’s data do not appear to be represen-
tative of the FMS and HR high-function
markets. Oracle submitted data for 728
bids between 2001 and 2003 with an aver-
age license value of EUR 708,851. These
data contain a number of bids for niche
products and best-of-breed solutions not
falling into the product market and having
a much lower license value (for example,
235 bids with license values between
EUR2,000 and EUR 100,000). As Oracle was
not able to specify the modules contained
in these bids, the Commission could not
verify whether or not they fell within the
markets for high-function FMS and HR
solutions. Furthermore, in his testimony in
the US trial, Professor Elzinga used a
threshold of EUR 500,000 in order to define
an appropriate sample of bids belonging to
the markets for high function FMS and HR
applications.
(120) On the basis of the market investi-
gation and the bid data submitted by
Oracle, the Commission used the value of
EUR 1 million for the net license fee as one
proxy for the value of bids containing high-
function FMS and HR software. Given the
considerations set out in the preceding
recital, it can be safely assumed that anyone
winning a bid above this threshold for
applications in the field of HR and FMS
may be considered as a supplier of high-
function FMS and HR solutions.
(121) The Commission further comple-
mented this proxy by a delineation of “large
enterprises with complex functional needs”
as customers of such software solutions that
cope with the complexity of their overall
needs. The great majority of the respon-
dents in the market investigation confirmed
that thresholds of 10,000 employees or of
revenues exceeding EUR 1 billion might be
an appropriate proxy for a rough qualifica-
tion of large undertakings with complex
functional needs. 
Competitive Constraints
The California court and the Brussels panel
also disagree on the power of three forces that
can purportedly rein in a merged company’s abil-
ity to control prices in the market: best-of-breed
suppliers, outsourcing, and systems integrators.
Judge Walker agrees that all three will act as com-
petitive restraints, although he barely discusses
the last of the three, and the Commission rules
that none of them will.
The M&A journal
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Here is Judge Walker on the question of best-
of-breed suppliers:
Each ERP pillar consists of “modules”
that automate particular processes or func-
tions. HRM and FMS software each consists
of numerous modules. HRM modules
include such functions as payroll, benefits,
sales incentives, time management and
many others. FMS modules include such
functions as general ledger, accounts receiv-
able, accounts payable, asset management
and many others.
“Core” HRM modules are those specific
ERP modules that individually or collec-
tively automate payroll, employee tracking
and benefits administration. Core FMS
modules are those ERP modules that indi-
vidually or collectively track general ledger,
accounts receivable, accounts payable and
cash and asset management business
processes. Core FMS and HRM modules are
offered by all the ERP vendors that have
HRM and FMS offerings. Large enterprise
customers rarely, if ever, buy core HRM or
FMS modules in isolation. Customarily,
FMS and HRM software are purchased in
bundles with other products. Customers
purchase a cluster of products such as
Oracle’s E-Business Suite that provide the
customer with a “stack” of software and
technology, which may include core HRM
or FMS applications, add-on modules, “cus-
tomer-facing” business applications such as
CRM software [customer relations manage-
ment], and the infrastructure components
(application servers and database) on
which the applications run.
ERP vendors, including Oracle and
PeopleSoft, sell modules individually as
well as integrated suite products. Some ERP
vendors sell only one or a few modules.
Individual modules are referred to as
“point solutions” as they address a particu-
lar need of the enterprise. ERP vendors that
sell products for only one or a limited num-
ber [of] pillars are referred to as point solu-
tion or “best of breed” providers. A cus-
tomer licensing a particular module
because it fits the specific needs of the
enterprise is sometimes said to be seeking a
best of breed or point solution. An ERP cus-
tomer that acquires best of breed or point
solutions faces the task of integrating these
solutions with one another and with the
customer’s existing ERP or legacy footprint.
. . .
Best of breed vendors. Ninety percent of
ERP sales are purchases of software “bun-
dles” containing several pillars; rarely does
a consumer purchase a single pillar. FMS
and HRM pillars typically are sold in a bun-
dle along with additional kinds of ERP,
such as CRM or SCM. Further, the dis-
counts that are offered to potential con-
sumers are based on the value of the entire
bundle, not simply based upon the pres-
ence of an HRM or FMS pillar. Accordingly,
when Oracle or PeopleSoft offers a discount
on a bundle, it is doing so in order to ensure
that the customer purchases all the pillars
from Oracle or
PeopleSoft, rather than
turn to a best of breed
vendor that specializes
in selling a single kind
of pillar. One best of
breed vendor, Siebel,
sells individual pillars
of CRM. Testimony sug-
gests Siebel is recog-
nized industry-wide as
selling high-quality
CRM, equal to or better
than the CRM pillars in
Tier One software. . . .
Best of breed solutions.
The court does not dis-
miss defendant’s bun-
dle argument as an “elaborate distraction”
or “economical nonsense” as plaintiffs urge.
The reality of this industry is that 90 percent
of consumers purchase software “bundles”
containing several pillars; rarely does a con-
sumer purchase a single pillar. FMS and
HRM pillars typically are sold in bundle
along with additional kinds of EAS, such as
CRM or SCM. Further, the discounts that
are offered to potential consumers are
based on the value of the entire bundle, not
simply based upon the presence of an HRM
or FMS pillar. Accordingly, when Oracle or
PeopleSoft offer a discount on a bundle,
they are doing so in order to ensure that the
customer purchases all the pillars from
Oracle or PeopleSoft, rather than turn to a
best of breed vendor.
The Commission, in contrast, decides that
best-of-breed vendors would not be able to act as
a competitive restraint should the new Oracle
raises its prices. 
The Commission writes as follows:
(93) In response to the Commission’s state-
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ment of objections, Oracle stated that the
Commission’s investigation would prove that
LCEs (large enterprises with complex func-
tional needs) are as likely to buy best-of-breed
software as they are likely to buy “suites”. In
particular, the responses to the market investi-
gation suggest that many LCEs mix and
match suites and best of breed in HR and
FMS functionalities, thereby showing that
demand is extremely heterogeneous. Oracle
CEO Larry Ellison’s own
prediction that best-of-
breed would lose sales to
the advantage of suites
finally proved to be
wrong.
(94) Oracle’s claim is
incorrect insofar as it
would allegedly dem-
onstrate that best-of-
breed software is a
competitive constraint
to “high-function” soft-
ware. Customers do not
consider best-of-breed
software as an alterna-
tive to high-function
HR and FMS solutions.
In the market investiga-
tion, the majority of the customers stated
that they do not at all consider best-of-
breed providers as a suitable alternative,
even in response to an adverse change in
the market conditions for high-function HR
and FMS “core functionalities” resulting
from the proposed merger. The main rea-
sons are that the implementation of a large
number of small packages would lead to
disparate applications and a disparate tech-
nical architecture with the consequence that
the applications would not be well inte-
grated with each other. In any case, such an
approach of integrating different best-of-
breed solutions would result in high inte-
gration costs (which already for the imple-
mentation of integrated EAS suites may
exceed the license costs by up to 10 times as
the EAS software has to be adapted to the
needs of the individual enterprise and the
IT used outside the scope of EAS solutions).
Respondents further pointed to the fact that
the very purpose of the packaged software
is to eliminate the integration problems and
costs which were associated with such a
best-of-breed approach and that an assem-
bling of best-of-breed solutions would
mean a return to the situation in which
most companies found themselves before
implementing EAS suites.
(95) Other respondents pointed out that
they consider best-of-breed applications
only as complementary solutions to FMS
and HR suites (or FMS core functionalities).
This results from the fact that best-of-breed
vendors are niche market providers with a
very specific focus. Also those respondents,
therefore, do not consider best-of-breed
solutions as an alternative to high-function
FMS and HR core functionalities, but only
as complements if the functionality is not
available from the EAS provider.
(96) This is further confirmed by the mar-
ket investigation as regards the applications
already in use by customers (installed base).
In particular, between 0 percent and 6 per-
cent of respondents use only best-of-breed
software for core FMS functionalities (gen-
eral ledger, account payable, account receiv-
able, asset management) and between 8 per-
cent and 20 percent use only best-of-breed
software for core HR functionalities (person-
nel data, payroll benefits). As the installed
base of applications at customers includes
software which was installed before those
companies usually purchased suites, the
installed base may even be deemed to over-
state the importance of best-of-breed solu-
tions for core FMS and HR functionalities.
(97) Given the above, best-of-breed solu-
tions do not provide a competitive con-
straint on providers of HR and FMS high-
function core functionality. They may be
used—in any case alongside HR and FMS
suites—to complement the functionalities
offered by such suites or to serve very spe-
cific needs which are not covered by the
suites. In such circumstances bids may
occur in which best-of-breed providers
compete only for a certain functionality
with providers typically offering suites,
such as SAP, PeopleSoft or Oracle.
However, this does not mean that best-of-
breed providers can replace HR and FMS
core functionalities packaged in suites or
that they have a constraining effect on the
providers of HR and FMS high-function
suites in this respect.
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Outsourcing
Again, the two disagree on the affect of out-
sourcing, with Judge Walker viewing this as a
force that will help sustain competition, and the
Commission dismissing it as a corollary rather
than a substitute product:
Judge Walker describes outsourcing as fol-
lows:
Outsourcing: Because of the extensive
amount of training and maintenance
involved in implementing ERP packages
purchased from ERP vendors, some compa-
nies have chosen an alternative solution—
outsourcing. Outsourcing occurs when a
company hires another firm to perform
business functions, often HRM functions. A
company may outsource a single HRM
function, such as benefits, pensions or pay-
roll, or it may choose to outsource its entire
continuum of HRM needs. Many firms
have outsourcing capabilities. Some of the
outsources discussed at trail include:
Accenture, Fidelity, ADP, Mellon, Exult,
Hewitt, Aon and Convergys. Outsourcing
firms may process a company’s HR data
using HRM software manufactured by an
ERP vendor, such as Oracle, but some out-
sourcing firms use internally created HRM
software (such as Fidelity using HR
Access). . . .
Regarding outsourcing, Hausman pre-
sented evidence of over twenty large enter-
prises, such as Bank of America and AT&T,
who currently outsource all or some of their
HRM needs. And this phenomenon was
occurring long before Oracle made its take-
over offer to PeopleSoft. These large enter-
prise customers would not be outsourcing
if they did not find this option to be equal to
or better than the purchase of high function
software from a vendor. If this many corpo-
rations can currently have their HRM needs
effectively met by outsourcing, it only fol-
lows that many more customers could fol-
low suit should a post-merger SSNIP occur
in the high function market.
Hausman gave the example of MIT, his
employer, outsourcing its HRM to Fidelity,
who he claims do “a heck of a lot better”
than MIT personnel. Hausman presented
evidence that many companies have chosen
outsourcing; these include: Bank of
America, Motorola, International Paper,
McKesson, American Express and Sony.
These are “sophisticated” companies, with
a lot of complex transactions, and they have
clearly found outsourcing a satisfactory
alternative. Hausman’s demonstratives
alone listed seven outsourcing firms capa-
ble of handling the HR for large companies;
these include Fidelity, Accenture, ACS,
Exult and Mellon, among others.
Accordingly, both Campbell and
Hausman asserted that any product market
must include outsourcing solutions as a
viable substitute to which consumers can
turn in the event that a merger Oracle/
PeopleSoft imposes a SSNIP.
The Commission is not impressed with the
argument that outsourcing
will alleviate any constrict-
ing effects of the proposed
deal. Says Mr. Volcker:
“The Commission was for
some reason reluctant to
accept the outsourcing
argument. They cite very
little evidence from their
own investigation but they
have lengthy footnotes
about what was said in the
U.S. trial. They cite these
factual elements and then
come to the opposite con-
clusion.”
Here is how the Com-
mission dismisses out-
sourcing as a competitive
restraint:
(100) In reply to the
Commission’s state-
ment of objections, Oracle claimed that out-
sourcers are too easily dismissed by the
Commission as providing no relevant com-
petitive constraints on EAS suppliers.
Oracle claimed that the  Commission is
wrong in asserting that outsourcers having
their own HR or FMS license from third
party EAS vendors do not provide competi-
tive constraints, since, in this way, it misun-
derstands the outsourcers’ role of “arbi-
trage” (similar to that of system integrators)
vis-à-vis the EAS vendors (offsetting any
attempt of possible price discrimination by
EAS vendors).
(101) According to Oracle, outsourcers do
compete head-on with HR and FMS ven-
dors and the Commission’s assertion to the
contrary would not be based on any cus-
tomer response (apart from one by
Deutsche Telekom, who, according to
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Oracle, misunderstood the Commission’s
question). Overwhelming evidence repre-
sented by surveys and analyst reports
would instead show an incontrovertible
reality: the importance of outsourcing in
both HR and FMS, including for large cus-
tomers. Moreover, outsourcing would not
be limited to regions of the world, HR or
FMS functionalities, or industry verticals, as
important BPO outsourcers like ADP,
Ceridian, Exult are
expanding their scope
of activity beyond core
HR to also include tasks
such as recruiting,
employees effective-
ness, and compensa-
tion. All the above
would demonstrate
that outsourcers do
form a significant com-
petitive constraint vis-
à-vis EAS software
providers.
(102) The Commis-
sion does not contest the fact that EAS out-
sourcing takes place on a large-scale basis
in the industry and that it is a very signifi-
cant phenomenon. However, the
Commission’s investigation, as well as evi-
dence stemming from the US trial, demon-
strated that customers would not outsource
in response to a SSNIP of high-function
software. First, outsourcing only involves
HR functionalities, not FMS. Therefore,
Oracle’s claim about competitive con-
straints stemming from outsourcing, theo-
retically, could have a standing only as
regards HR software. Second, it could only
be valid as regards Business Process
Outsourcing, that is to say, outsourcing per-
formed on the basis of proprietary software
of the outsourcer. If the customers are to
provide the software licenses to the out-
sourcer, they face the consequences of the
proposed transaction in the same way as if
no outsourcer is [sic] would be involved. If
the outsourcer uses software licenses from
one of the software vendors, the outsourcer
is faced with the consequences of the pre-
sent transaction as any other customer.
Even if an outsourcer were purchasing a
global license for its business (and therefore
for several customers), such a purchase
may involve high discounts as in the case of
other large customers, but it would not
enable the outsourcer to avoid any adverse
consequences which may arise from the
present transaction. In any case, out-
sourcers provide a service which goes far
beyond the provision of the necessary soft-
ware as done by EAS providers. In the US
trial, a representative of Fidelity, a major
outsourcer, stated that the cost of the license
fee paid by Fidelity for use of Oracle human
resources management software is proba-
bly less than 1 or 2 percent of the total cost
of human resources outsourcing. A price
increase of the software licenses for cus-
tomers may therefore be considered to be
nearly negligible compared to the total
costs of outsourcing. The decision on out-
sourcing is usually driven by other factors
(for example, the cost of HR personnel)
rather than by a price increase of the appli-
cation software.
(103) In this respect, Mr. Larry Ellison
(Oracle’s CEO), in his deposition of 20
January 2004 in front of the US Department
of Justice, stated that the choice to out-
source a particular function is a corporate
decision and is not driven by the prices of
software license or maintenance. He also
added that the reason why outsourcers can
be in the business is that they have a uni-
form process and benefit from economies of
scale. This means that Mr. Ellison himself
acknowledges that outsourcers have less
flexibility to customize the process of each
customer.
(104) Moreover, evidence shows that out-
sourcing vendors targeting larger and most
complex organizations will support those
customers using an HR software licensed
from Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP, which
makes them a complement of high-function
HR software rather than a substitute for
them.
Systems Integrators
As for systems integrators, Judge Walker
seems to be impressed with the argument that
they, too, will help dilute any monopolistic urges
of a new Oracle by serving as  a platform for sales
and market entry by smaller software develop-
ers. But he does not come out with a definite
statement that sytems integrators would act as a
competitive restraint on a newly merged Oracle.
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Says Mr. Volcker: “It looks like Judge Walker had
an even more ambitious judgment in mind but
then decided that he’d had enough. The court
finds that systems integrators are a competitive
restraint, and then you read through the judg-
ment and there is no section on that. Maybe in
drafting he realized that his judgment was over-
due and that what he had done was already good
enough.”
The Commission rejects the notion explicitly,
and finds that systems integrators offer services
rather than products:
(110) In reply to the Commission’s state-
ment of objections, Oracle stated that the
Commission did not understand the central
role played by consultants and system inte-
grators in the EAS market and, in particu-
lar, misunderstood the massive competitive
constraint that they play vis-à-vis EAS ven-
dors as regards the following aspects: (1)
They provide customers with an asymmet-
rical information advantage over vendors
(this in itself offsets any possible attempt by
EAS vendors to price discriminate). (2)
They have the incentive to use their bar-
gaining power in order to squeeze EAS’s
vendor license fee as much as possible in
order to gain a higher share of integra-
tion/consultancy fees. (3) They have an
incentive and an interest in maintaining a
diversified supply structure and will even
sponsor a niche vendor through strategic
alliances if they feel that there are not suffi-
cient numbers of competitive alternatives
on the supply side.
(111) The Commission cannot reach a
conclusion on the basis of Oracle’s unsup-
ported contentions. Based on the informa-
tion in the file, it can be stated, in general
terms, that consultants and systems inte-
grators “[…] offer a solution that [is] con-
sider[ed] to be the best for the client. On
occasions this may include upgrading
legacy solutions in preference to imple-
menting an EAS solution such as SAP,
Oracle, or PeopleSoft. This will be deter-
mined by factors such as the projected costs
and benefits of different solutions and the
risks associated with enhancing legacy sys-
tems versus implementing an EAS.
(112) Consultants/systems integrators
work with clients to define their require-
ments and help them to meet those
requirements through standard software,
the modification thereof being a last
resort. Sometimes, when modifications are
necessary, they may well recommend that
these are done outside the core software in
order to facilitate upgrading (using APIs,
for example). In this respect they view
themselves as providing customers with a
kind of service that is nearly at odds with
any possible competitive constraint vis-à-
vis EAS vendors. As regards the cost of
integration services, it appears that these
integration services may range from one
time to six times the product’s license cost.
The costs of after sales service vary sub-
stantially depending
on the company’s
applications support
sourcing approach.
(113) These compa-
nies are not “product
companies”, they are
selling a service. That is
the reason why they
generally claim to offer
clients the most genuine
and independent advice on all areas of IT,
also with a view to providing IT outsourc-
ing services to them. In order to achieve
this, they generally enter into strategic part-
nerships with various EAS suppliers and
are able to supply clients with “best of
breed” and tailor-made solutions in respect
of their requirements across the EAS “pil-
lars”. They also offer both set-up and imple-
mentation. That is also one reason why,
generally, consultants/integrators do not
necessarily regard themselves as direct
competitors of EAS suppliers, but rather as
complementary partners.
The Same Result
On September 9, 2004, Judge Walker denied
the DOJ’s request to enjoin the Oracle/PeopleSoft
merger:
In order to succeed on their claim, plain-
tiffs must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence (1) the relevant product and geo-
graphic market, and within this market (2)
the effect of Oracle’s acquisition of
PeopleSoft may be substantially to diminish
competition.
Plaintiffs alleged a product market lim-
ited to HRM and FMS software licensed by
Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP. Plaintiffs also
alleged a geographic market limited to the
United States.
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Plaintiffs have proven that the relevant
product market does not include incumbent
systems or the integration layer. But plain-
tiffs failed to prove that outsourcing solu-
tions, best of breed solutions and so-called
mid-market vendors should be excluded
from the relevant product market.
Furthermore, plaintiffs have failed to estab-
lish that the area of effective competition is
limited to the United States. Accordingly,
plaintiffs have failed to
meet their burden of
proving the relevant
market for section 7
analysis.
Because plaintiffs have
failed to meet this pred-
icative burden, plaintiffs
are not entitled to a pre-
sumption of illegality
under Philadelphia Nat
Bank or the Guidelines.
Plaintiffs have failed
to prove the likelihood
that a post-merger Oracle and SAP would
tacitly coordinate by allocating customers
or markets. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have
not met their burden of establishing anti-
competitive coordinated effects.
Plaintiffs have failed to prove an area of
localized competition between Oracle and
PeopleSoft in which a post-merger Oracle
could profitably impose a SSNIP.
Accordingly, plaintiffs have not met their
burden of establishing the likelihood of
anticompetitive unilateral effects. . . .
Because plaintiffs have not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
merger of Oracle and PeopleSoft is likely
substantially to lessen competition in a rel-
evant product and geographic market in
violation of 15 USC Section 7, the court
directs the entry of judgment against plain-
tiffs and in favor of Oracle Corporation.
Antitrust experts at Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer described the decision as follows: “The
court rejected the DOJ’s product market defini-
tion, holding that “high-function” HRM and FMS
does not exist as a separate and distinct line of
commerce. It concluded that the DOJ had not
proved that HRM and FMS software products
from vendors such as Lawson, AMS and
Microsoft, and from outsourcing firms such as
Fidelity, would not constrain a combined
Oracle/PeopleSoft from imposing a small but sig-
nificant non-transitory price increase. . . . [T]he
court concluded that the witnesses testified about
the products they preferred to use, not the prod-
ucts they could use. The court concluded that cus-
tomer preferences could not support a separate
product market. . . . Because of the DOJ’s failure to
define a product market that would result in ‘anti-
competitive unilateral effects,’ the court held that
the DOJ failed to show that the merger of Oracle
and PeopleSoft was likely to substantially lessen
competition in a relevant product market.”
The Commission accepts the product defini-
tion argued by PeopleSoft, but finds that there are
enough players in that market to prevent a
merged Oracle from exercising undue power.
Says Wilmer Cutler ’s Mr. Volcker: “The
Commission decided that it was not a three-to-
two merger, but a much more populated field.”
Adds another competition expert in Brussels:
“The Commission still uses and in fact defends
the high-function software definition despite
Walker ’s judgment. But this is completely
abstract and does not tie back to the facts of the
case.”
The Commission concludes its ruling as fol-
lows:
(205) [I]n the light of the Commission’s
findings that buyers are very sophisticated
when acquiring software, that they can
structure the competitive bidding process
as they prefer in order to exert competitive
pressure on the bidders, including re-invit-
ing bidders previously excluded from the
contest, that they are in control of the flow
of information to the bidders about who
else is bidding, that the market after the
merger will still contain more bidders than
buyers usually invite to the final round and
that SAP remains a very strong competitor,
it cannot be concluded that Oracle is likely
to be in a position to profitably increase
prices after the merger.
(206) In the statement of objections the
Commission also based its concerns on the
finding that, in addition to the non-coordi-
nated effects, the two remaining players
would be in a position to further soften com-
petition by coordinating their competitive
behaviour. The theory of coordination was
based on a definition of the market which,
after the merger, would consist of only
Oracle and SAP and which relied in particu-
lar on the symmetrical market shares of a
combined Oracle/PeopleSoft and SAP and
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an alignment of incentives between them
due to the fact that SAP is by far the largest
reseller of Oracle databases. As parameters
for adopting a common policy, the
Commission identified the allocation of cus-
tomers in a duopoly, a reduction in price
competition and a common understanding
to slow-down the addition of further func-
tionalities and the improvement of products.
(207) In the light of the conclusions
regarding the market definition it is not
possible to conclude that the merger will
lead to a collective dominant position of a
combined Oracle/PeopleSoft and SAP on
the basis of coordinated effects. . . .
(209) In a market in which—in addition to
Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP—Lawson,
Intentia, IFS, QAD and Microsoft are also
present as vendors of high-function FMS
and HM applications it appears difficult to
argue that these players may reach a com-
mon understanding as regards the parame-
ters outlined above. In particular, an alloca-
tion of customers according to geography or
sector will not be possible due to the larger
group of possible vendors of such software.
Also, among seven credible bidders a com-
mon understanding as regards a softening
of price competition and a slow-down of
product improvements appears difficult to
reach and to sustain. The difficulty in reach-
ing a common understanding lies in partic-
ular in the fact that HR and FMS high-func-
tion software are differentiated products.
These products do not only differ between
the various vendors, but also between the
products sold by one vendor to different
customers due to the adaptation of the prod-
ucts to the needs of the respective customer.
The larger number of vendors also reduces
the transparency in the market and would
make retaliatory actions more difficult. . . .
(218) Given the limited strength of a com-
bined Oracle/PeopleSoft in the markets for
HR and FMS applications adapted to and
typically purchased by mid-size companies
and the numerous other players also active
in these markets, it can be excluded that the
transaction would lead to competition con-
cerns in the markets for mid-market HR
and FMS applications, irrespective of the
exact delineation of such markets.
(219) For the reasons set out above, it is
concluded that the proposed concentra-
tion does not create nor strengthen a dom-
inant position as a result of which effec-
tive competition would be significantly
impeded in the common market or in a
substantial part of it. The concentration is
therefore to be declared compatible with
the common market pursuant to Article
8(2) of the Merger Regulation and with the
EEA Agreement pursuant to Article 57
thereof.
Super Mario
Aside from the purely theoretical issues at play,
what effect did such extra-
legal factors as saber-rat-
tling, Mario Monti’s
impending retirement, and
trans-Atlantic politics exert
on the Commission’s ruling?
Was the Commission
more willing to cooperate
given the fact that Oracle
had made it so clear that it
would fight to the end?
Says one insider: “It did
have something to do with
it. They realized they
would be taking a considerable risk.”
What would have happened if the Department
of Justice had not accepted the district court’s rul-
ing and had decided to appeal instead? “By
announcing that it would not appeal, “ says one
M&A expert, “the DOJ took the political heat off
the commission. Even though the DOJ had
opposed the transaction, they seemed to be saying
to the Commission that after the judgment they
could not reach a different conclusion without
causing a big rift with the U.S.” 
What about all the ways in which the
Commission’s decision differed from the district
court ruling? “One theory is that after
GE/Honeywell, the Commission was making a
political decision and hiding that fact: ‘Let’s look
different and independent, but let’s also come out
with the same result.’ ”
Some in Brussels believe that Mario Monti
wanted to preside over a decision that would
stand in contrast to the brouhaha over the
GE/Honeywell case. It is certainly true that the
Commission restarted its clock just in time for it
to fall within Mr. Monti’s tenure. Says one mem-
ber of the Oracle team: “We were told by the offi-
cials that Mr. Monti wanted to decide this case
before he left office. Perhaps he did not want to
leave his successor, Mrs. Kroes, with a hot potato
as had happened to him when he took office.”
M—A
“We were told by 
the officials that 
Mario Monti wanted 
to decide this case
before he left office.”
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